Estimates of carbon-energy footprint inequality are increasingly being used to assign responsibility for climate change. At a global [@piketty_carbon_2015 @kartha_carbon_2020 @gore_extreme_2015 @hubacek_global_2017-1 @oswald_large_2020], regional [@ivanova_unequal_2020], and within-country level [@wiedenhofer_unequal_2017 @golley_income_2012 @steenolsen_carbon_2016 @weber_quantifying_2008 @hardadi_implications_2020 @oswald_large_2020], energy use and carbon emissions are often highly unequal. The proposed solution is often a call to reduce the carbon-energy inequality by reducing over-consumption, especially by the richest at the top of the economic distribution, which would then also reduce the carbon-energy footprint, everything else held equal. Complicating this picture, however, is the fact that carbon-energy intensities of consumption usually differ between economic groups. This is due to different consumption baskets and different access to technology. That lower-income groups tend to have higher carbon-energy intensities is an important finding from the environmental Kuznet's curve literature [@berthe_mechanisms_2015 @scruggs_political_1998], but these findings are often not well integrated with the current carbon-energy footprint inequality literature, that focuses more on assigning responsibility based on aggregate carbon-energy footprint inequality.
In this study, we have found that, for Europe as a whole, lower-economic groups have higher carbon-energy intensities of consumption (although this is not necessarily true within each European country) [@sommer_carbon_2017 @kerkhof_determinants_200]. These higher intensities come almost entirely from domestic electricity production and heating/cooling for shelter, in a handful of Central and Eastern European countries. This is of course already an important focus of European climate policy, but reducing these intensities should be a major priority for investment fund allocation going forward, especially within a framework such as the EU's European Green Deal [@bianco_understanding_2019]. Bringing intensities of consumption for all economic groups in line with those of higher-economic groups in Europe with access to the cleanest and most efficient available technologies, would substantially reduce the European household carbon-energy footprint, everything else held equal. The unequal intensity structure hinders clear conclusions on carbon-energy footprint inequality. We have shown that in an important sector such as shelter, lower-economic groups have almost the same level of footprint as higher-economic groups despite a fraction of the expenditure, because of their higher intensities. This can then be misleading in terms of assigning responsibility for climate change. Bringing carbon-energy intensities of all economic groups in line with the top group, and thus removing the inequality in intensity structure, would reduce the carbon-energy footprint, all else held equal, but *increase* carbon-energy inequality. The reduction of carbon-energy inequality is not a meaningful goal by itself.
In this study, we have found that, for Europe as a whole, lower-economic groups have higher carbon-energy intensities of consumption (although this is not necessarily true within each European country) [@sommer_carbon_2017 @kerkhof_determinants_200]. These higher intensities come almost entirely from domestic electricity production and heating/cooling for shelter, in a handful of Central and Eastern European countries. This is of course already an important focus of European climate policy, but reducing these intensities should be a major priority for investment fund allocation going forward, especially within a framework such as the EU's European Green Deal [@bianco_understanding_2019]. Efforts to break consumer lock-in to these high intensities must be occurring alongside any policies that seek to continue reducing intensities and aggregate consumption higher up the distribution. Bringing intensities of consumption for all economic groups in line with those of higher-economic groups in Europe with access to the cleanest and most efficient available technologies, would substantially reduce the European household carbon-energy footprint, everything else held equal. The unequal intensity structure hinders clear conclusions on carbon-energy footprint inequality. We have shown that in an important sector such as shelter, lower-economic groups have almost the same level of footprint as higher-economic groups despite a fraction of the expenditure, because of their higher intensities. This can then be misleading in terms of assigning responsibility for climate change. Bringing carbon-energy intensities of all economic groups in line with the top group, and thus removing the inequality in intensity structure, would reduce the carbon-energy footprint, all else held equal, but *increase* carbon-energy inequality. The reduction of carbon-energy inequality is not a meaningful goal by itself.
At current European consumption inequality, reducing the European household carbon-energy footprint in line with 1.5°C decarbonisation scenarios could theoretically be achieved at the mean. Current consumption inequality becomes a barrier, however, to achieving both these scenario targets *and* providing minimum energy use (and minimum carbon in the short-term) for decent living to every European. At a global level, there is some concern that achieving sweeping poverty reduction in many regions of the world may put achieving global climate targets at risk (ref - Hubacek). In the European context, although less unequal than the globe as a whole, if/as lower-consumption groups increase their income and consumption, energy use and carbon emissions will increase if more efficient and cleaner technology is not adopted at a fast enough rate. Achieving an average per capita/adult equivalent unit energy use and carbon footprint in Europe, in scenarios that reach the Paris agreement goals, means either doing so at current consumption inequality levels and keeping lower-economic groups near or below minimum energy use levels for decent living, or reducing consumption inequality. We have shown that achieving both decarbonisation scenario targets *and* minimum energy use levels for decent living in Europe requires potentially drastic reductions in economic inequality alongside the appropriate targeted climate-energy measures for the different economic groups and countries.
At current European consumption inequality, reducing the European household carbon-energy footprint in line with 1.5°C decarbonisation scenarios could theoretically be achieved at the mean. Current consumption inequality becomes a barrier, however, to achieving both these scenario targets *and* providing minimum energy use (and minimum carbon in the short-term) for decent living to every European. At a global level, there is some concern that achieving sweeping poverty reduction in many regions of the world may put achieving global climate targets at risk (ref - Hubacek). In the European context, although less unequal than the globe as a whole, if/as lower-consumption groups increase their income and consumption, energy use and carbon emissions will increase if more efficient and cleaner technology is not adopted at a fast enough rate. Achieving an average per capita/adult equivalent unit energy use and carbon footprint in Europe, in scenarios that reach the Paris agreement goals, means either doing so at current consumption inequality levels and keeping lower-economic groups near or below minimum energy use levels for decent living, or reducing consumption inequality. We have shown that achieving both decarbonisation scenario targets *and* minimum energy use levels for decent living in Europe requires potentially drastic reductions in economic inequality, alongside the appropriate targeted climate-energy measures for the different economic groups and countries.
