Our results show that both of these factors play a role (Figure 2). The housing sector stands out with a carbon intensity of consumption more than 6 times higher in the bottom decile (`r int_co2eq_housing_bottom_decile` kgCO2eq/€) than in the top decile (`r int_co2eq_housing_top_decile` kgCO2eq/€). Housing has the highest variance in energy and carbon intensity among expenditure deciles, and for the bottom deciles, it is the most energy and carbon intensive category. Overall, with increasing expenditure decile, the shares of mobility, services and housing expenditures increase and the shares of food and goods decrease. The bottom decile spent an average of `r exp_share_housing_bottom_decile`% of their household expenditure on housing, while the top decile spent `r exp_share_housing_top_decile`%. Households in the top decile spent about `r exp_share_services_top_decile`% on services, which has the lowest energy and carbon intensities of all final consumption categories, compared to `r exp_share_services_bottom_decile`% in the bottom decile.
The tendency for energy and carbon intensity to decrease with increasing affluence has been reported for the global level between countries [@hubacek_global_2017 @berthe_mechanisms_2015 @scruggs_political_1998] and also within Europe [@sommer_carbon_2017 @bianco_understanding_2019]. Our results show that the four lowest European expenditure deciles make up over 80% of the population in Eastern European countries, while less than 20% of the population in the higher-income European countries (Scandinavia, Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and Ireland) are in the lowest European expenditure deciles (see SI, Figure S1).
The tendency for energy and carbon intensity to decrease with increasing affluence has been reported for the global level between countries [@hubacek_global_2017 @berthe_mechanisms_2015 @scruggs_political_1998 @weber_quantifying_2008] and also within Europe [@sommer_carbon_2017 @bianco_understanding_2019 @kerkhof_determinants_2009]. Our results show that the four lowest European expenditure deciles make up over 80% of the population in Eastern European countries, while less than 20% of the population in the higher-income European countries (Scandinavia, Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and Ireland) are in the lowest European expenditure deciles (see SI, Figure S1).
The high intensities in the bottom four European expenditure deciles can be attributed in large part to more inefficient and dirtier domestic energy supply and demand technologies for heating and electricity generation in Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Romania. Poland alone was responsible for about 40% of total coal combustion for heat production in Europe in 2015 [@eurostat_eurostat_nodate-2], and had a higher average intensity of carbon per MJ of heat delivered than both Europe and the world [@werner_international_2017]. We did not account for energy subsidies here, but different subsidy levels in different countries could also contribute to higher energy and carbon intensities [@sovacool_reviewing_2017].
Based on this counterfactual distribution of the energy footprint using homogeneous supply technologies, we then scale down the energy footprint across European expenditure deciles to meet supply constraints on average and, where necessary, "squeeze" the distribution to not undershoot minimum energy requirements in any decile (Figure 5).
Both the DLE and LED scenarios satisfy final energy demand for a decent standard of living and are compatible with the 1.5°C target without resorting to CCS technologies [@millward-hopkins_providing_2020 @grubler_low_2018]. The DLE scenario explicitly envisions absolute global equality (a 10:10 ratio of 1) in energy consumption, except for small differences in required energy consumption based on climatic and demographic factors, as well as differences in population density [@millward-hopkins_providing_2020]. The LED scenario does not explicitly discuss distributional aspects beyond giving different final energy values for the Global North (around 53 household GJ/ae) and the Global South (around 20 household GJ/ae) [@grubler_low_2018]. However, due to the bottom-up construction of this demand scenario, these values can be interpreted as estimates for minimum required final energy. The energy supply scenarios do not include specific details about how the energy footprints are distributed within countries [@riahi_shared_2017]. They achieve energy savings through the replacement of carbon-intensive fossil fuels by cleaner alternatives, efficiency improvements including the electrification of final energy, and some measures towards energy conservation [@riahi_shared_2017].
Both the DLE and LED scenarios satisfy final energy demand for a decent standard of living and are compatible with the 1.5°C target without resorting to CCS technologies [@millward-hopkins_providing_2020 @grubler_low_2018]. The DLE scenario explicitly envisions absolute global equality (a 10:10 ratio of 1) in energy consumption, except for small differences in required energy consumption based on climatic and demographic factors, as well as differences in population density [@millward-hopkins_providing_2020]. The LED scenario does not explicitly discuss distributional aspects beyond giving different final energy values for the Global North (around 53 household GJ/ae) and the Global South (around 20 household GJ/ae) [@grubler_low_2018]. However, due to the bottom-up construction of this demand scenario, these values can be interpreted as estimates for minimum required final energy. The energy supply scenarios do not include specific details about how the energy footprints are distributed within countries [@riahi_shared_2017 @rao_improving_2017]. They achieve energy savings through the replacement of carbon-intensive fossil fuels by cleaner alternatives, efficiency improvements including the electrification of final energy, and some measures towards energy conservation [@riahi_shared_2017].
```{r figure5, out.width="70%", fig.align="center", fig.cap="Average energy available for Europe in decarbonisation scenarios, positioned in corridor between a range of minimum energy requirements and a range of associated maximum inequality. All expenditure deciles have 'best technology' already."}
@@ -996,15 +996,15 @@ The colored curves in Figure 5 represent constant average household energy footp
# Conclusions
To achieve the aggregated energy use targeted in the different 1.5°C compatible scenarios, the energy footprint needs to be reduced in all European countries, as well as almost all expenditure groups. The GHG intensity of energy services needs to be reduced across all expenditure groups. The focus in the lower deciles should be on efficiency improvements, and on absolute reductions in energy consumption in the upper deciles. Even under our bold assumption that the energy and emission efficiencies of the ten expenditure quantiles converge and demand develops as in the 1.5°C scenarios, our results show that a drastic reduction in the inequality of energy footprints is needed to secure decent living standards for all Europeans.
To achieve the aggregated final energy targeted in the different 1.5°C compatible scenarios, the energy footprint needs to be reduced in all European countries, as well as almost all expenditure groups. The carbon intensity of energy services needs to be reduced across all expenditure groups. The focus in the lower deciles should be on efficiency improvements, and on absolute reductions in energy consumption in the upper deciles. Even under our bold assumption that the energy and emission efficiencies of all expenditure deciles converge, and demand develops as in the 1.5°C scenarios, our results show that a drastic reduction in the inequality of energy footprints is needed to secure decent living standards for all Europeans.
This illustrates an immense political challenge: ensuring a decent life for all at the targeted energy level of the minimum consumption scenarios (X GJ per adult equivalent, down from an average of X GJ) requires a fundamental reorganization of almost all areas of life and economy. It seems hard to imagine how, for example, the living space per capita can be reduced from about 40m² to 15m², or the number of private cars can be reduced from X to X which are the assumption behind the [xxx] scenario. However, each increase in the minimum energy consumption for a decent life also increases the need to redistribute the energy footprint between countries and expenditure groups, i.e. to reduce energy inequality ever more drastically. Achieving this seems at least as difficult politically. This shows that, in addition to measures to reduce average energy consumption and emissions, instruments to reduce inequality in energy consumption must be developed to ensure a just transition that "leaves no body behind", as the European Green Deal promises.
This illustrates an immense political challenge: ensuring a decent standard of living for all at the targeted final energy level of the minimum demand scenarios (between around 15 to 53 household GJ per adult equivalent [@grubler_low_2018 @millward-hopkins_providing_2020], down from an average of `r energy_pae_mean` household GJ/ae) requires a fundamental reorganization of almost all areas of life and economy. It seems hard to imagine how, for example, the living space per capita can be reduced from about 40m² to 15m², or the number of private cars can be reduced from X to X which are the assumption behind the [xxx] scenario. However, each increase in the minimum energy required for a decent life also increases the need to redistribute the energy footprint between countries and expenditure groups, i.e. to reduce energy inequality ever more drastically. Achieving this seems at least as difficult politically. This shows that, in addition to measures to reduce average energy consumption and emissions, instruments to reduce inequality in energy consumption must be developed to ensure a just transition that "leaves no one behind", as the European Green Deal promises [@european_commission_communication_2019].
Particularly in the coming phase of necessary restructuring of the European economy, a social protection mechanism of whatever kind assuring a decent life will play a central role. However, the current organization of the eurozone offers little monetary or fiscal leeway to member states, especially the less wealthy where this would be particularly important, to strengthen or introduce such measures. At the European level, implementation fails due to the lack of a common economic policy, as well as the fact that the ECB (unlike other central banks) only has a mandate to stabilize prices, but not to provide full employment or other effective means of social protection for European citizens. At least in the Eurozone, there is a great need for action to increase the scope for national and/or EU-wide policy making; both to ensure the social protection of citizens and to enable the necessary investments to restructure infrastructure and the economy.
Particularly in the coming phase of necessary restructuring of the European economy, a social protection mechanism of whatever kind assuring a decent life will play a central role. However, the current organization of the eurozone offers little monetary or fiscal leeway to EU member states, especially the less wealthy where this would be particularly important, to strengthen or introduce such measures. At the European level, implementation fails due to the lack of a common economic policy, as well as the fact that the European Central Bank (ECB) (unlike other central banks) only has a mandate to stabilize prices, but not to provide full employment or other effective means of social protection for European citizens [ref]. At least in the eurozone, there is a great need for action to increase the scope for national and/or EU-wide policy making; both to ensure the social protection of citizens and to enable the necessary investments to restructure infrastructure and the economy.
Strong progressive carbon pricing could have a positive distributional effect besides its effect on absolute emission reduction (MCC/Edenhofer). In addition, other distribution instruments such as wealth and inheritance taxes, more progressive income tax, will have to be discussed in order to reduce the large differences in purchasing power within and between the countries of the EU, at least as long as expenditure remains coupled to environmental footprints.
Strong progressive carbon pricing could have a positive distributional effect besides its effect on absolute emission reduction [ref: MCC/Edenhofer]. In addition, other distribution instruments such as wealth and inheritance taxes, more progressive income taxes, will have to be discussed in order to reduce the large differences in purchasing power within and between the countries of Europe, at least as long as expenditure remains coupled to environmental footprints [@piketty_carbon_2015].
Our study highlights the challenges largely implicit in the 1.5°C scenarios with respect to securing a decent standard of living for all, and provides further evidence that achieving this dual objective likely requires a shift in the current policy focus on growth in favor of decreasing environmental impacts and increasing social equity (Haberl, 2020, D’Alessandro 2020). Although our empirical investigation is limited to countries in Europe, we contend that our main conclusions apply in a similar or stronger form to the global achievement of climate and equity goals as articulated in the SDGs.
Our study highlights the challenges largely implicit in the 1.5°C scenarios with respect to securing a decent standard of living for all, and provides further evidence that achieving this dual objective likely requires a shift in the current policy focus on growth in favor of decreasing environmental impacts and increasing social equity (Haberl, 2020, D’Alessandro 2020). Although our empirical investigation is limited to countries in Europe, we contend that our main conclusions apply in a similar or stronger form to the global achievement of climate and equity goals [@hubacek_poverty_2017 @woodward_incrementum_2015], as articulated in the sustainable development goals.
file={Full Text PDF:/home/jaccard/.mozilla/firefox/67kb6jd5.default/zotero/storage/SMNK7DK2/Hubacek et al. - 2017 - Poverty eradication in a carbon constrained world.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:/home/jaccard/.mozilla/firefox/67kb6jd5.default/zotero/storage/I4SHXRCH/s41467-017-00919-4.html:text/html}
}
@article{haberl_systematic_2020,
title={A systematic review of the evidence on decoupling of {GDP}, resource use and {GHG} emissions, part {II}: synthesizing the insights},
issn={1748-9326},
shorttitle={A systematic review of the evidence on decoupling of {GDP}, resource use and {GHG} emissions, part {II}},
abstract={Strategies toward ambitious climate targets usually rely on the concept of “decoupling”; that is, they aim at promoting economic growth while reducing the use of natural resources and GHG emissions. GDP growth coinciding with absolute reductions in emissions or resource use is denoted as “absolute decoupling”, as opposed to “relative decoupling”, where resource use or emissions increase less so than does GDP. Based on the bibliometric mapping in part I (Wiedenhofer et al., this issue), we synthesize the evidence emerging from the selected 835 peer-reviewed articles. We evaluate empirical studies of decoupling related to final/useful energy, exergy, use of material resources, as well as CO2 and total GHG emissions. We find that relative decoupling is frequent for material use as well as GHG and CO2 emissions but not for useful exergy, a quality-based measure of energy use. Primary energy can be decoupled from GDP largely to the extent to which the conversion of primary energy to useful exergy is improved. Examples of absolute long-term decoupling are rare, but recently some industrialized countries have decoupled GDP from both production- and, weaklier, consumption-based CO2 emissions. We analyze policies or strategies in the decoupling literature by classifying them into three groups: (1) Green growth, if sufficient reductions of resource use or emissions were deemed possible without altering the growth trajectory. (2) Degrowth, if reductions of resource use or emissions were given priority over GDP growth. (3) Others, e.g. if the role of energy for GDP growth was analyzed without reference to climate change mitigation. We conclude that large rapid absolute reductions of resource use and GHG emissions cannot be achieved through observed decoupling rates, hence decoupling needs to be complemented by sufficiency-oriented strategies and strict enforcement of absolute reduction targets. More research is needed on interdependencies between wellbeing, resources and emissions.},
language={en},
urldate={2020-04-09},
journal={Environmental Research Letters},
author={Haberl, Helmut and Wiedenhofer, Dominik and Virág, Doris and Kalt, Gerald and Plank, Barbara and Brockway, Paul and Fishman, Tomer and Hausknost, Daniel and Krausmann, Fridolin P. and Leon-Gruchalski, Bartholomäus and Mayer, Andreas and Pichler, Melanie and Schaffartzik, Anke and Sousa, Tânia and Streeck, Jan and Creutzig, Felix},
year={2020},
keywords={Decoupling, resource use, zk},
file={IOP Full Text PDF:/home/jaccard/.mozilla/firefox/67kb6jd5.default/zotero/storage/GE9LCKSI/Haberl et al. - 2020 - A systematic review of the evidence on decoupling .pdf:application/pdf}
}
@article{stadler_exiobase_2018,
title={{EXIOBASE} 3: {Developing} a {Time} {Series} of {Detailed} {Environmentally} {Extended} {Multi}-{Regional} {Input}-{Output} {Tables}},
file={ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:/home/jaccard/.mozilla/firefox/67kb6jd5.default/zotero/storage/APCAISLN/Millward-Hopkins et al. - 2020 - Providing decent living with minimum energy A glo.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:/home/jaccard/.mozilla/firefox/67kb6jd5.default/zotero/storage/AMX52A6R/S0959378020307512.html:text/html}
}
@article{rao_improving_2017,
title={Improving poverty and inequality modelling in climate research},
abstract={As climate change progresses, the risk of adverse impacts on vulnerable populations is growing. As governments seek increased and drastic action, policymakers are likely to seek quantification of climate-change impacts and the consequences of mitigation policies on these populations. Current models used in climate research have a limited ability to represent the poor and vulnerable, or the different dimensions along which they face these risks. Best practices need to be adopted more widely, and new model features that incorporate social heterogeneity and different policy mechanisms need to be developed. Increased collaboration between modellers, economists, and other social scientists could aid these developments.},
language={en},
number={12},
urldate={2020-10-11},
journal={Nature Climate Change},
author={Rao, Narasimha D. and van Ruijven, Bas J. and Riahi, Keywan and Bosetti, Valentina},
month=dec,
year={2017},
note={Number: 12
Publisher: Nature Publishing Group},
keywords={ingram\_paper},
pages={857--862},
file={Full Text PDF:/home/jaccard/.mozilla/firefox/67kb6jd5.default/zotero/storage/2SZLKQB7/Rao et al. - 2017 - Improving poverty and inequality modelling in clim.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:/home/jaccard/.mozilla/firefox/67kb6jd5.default/zotero/storage/JH9EVJD7/s41558-017-0004-x.html:text/html}
}
@techreport{akenji_1.5-degree_2019,
title={1.5-{Degree} {Lifestyles}: {Targets} and options for reducing lifestyle carbon footprints},
