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@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ pdat_sector_summary_by_eu_ntile =
 
 # Introduction
 
-Decarbonizing the energy system in accordance with the Paris Accord requires a deep transformation of both the supply and the demand side [@grubler_low_2018]. On both sides, however, necessary transformation is restricted by different factors. On the supply side, there exist economic and physical upper limits of how much energy can be provided from renewable sources on the one hand, and how much CO2 removal infrastructure is used to compensate for remaining emissions from fossil fuels on the other. On the demand side [@creutzig_towards_2018], by contrast, there are lower limits to how much energy is minimally required for a decent life [@grubler_low_2018 @millward-hopkins_providing_2020], depending on different assumptions about production-consumption infrastructures and service provision [@creutzig_towards_2019], as well as the prevalent social ideas about what constitutes decent living [@rao_energy_2019 @millward-hopkins_providing_2020]. Maximum possible energy supply and minimum necessary energy demand describe the corridor in which the simultaneous achievement of climate targets and a decent living for all is possible and, at the same time, restricts the distribution of available energy services among the population. If this dual objective is taken seriously in European climate policy, then there are practical limits to how unequal the society of the future can be, which go beyond the purely political. In fact, a limited energy supply creates an obvious, if rarely acknowledged, zero-sum game where energetic over-consumption by some has to be compensated by less consumption by others. 
+Decarbonizing the energy system in accordance with the Paris Accord requires a deep transformation of both the supply and the demand side [@grubler_low_2018]. On both sides, however, necessary transformation is restricted by different factors. On the supply side, there exist economic and physical upper limits of how much energy can be provided from renewable sources on the one hand, and how much CO2 removal infrastructure is used to compensate for remaining emissions from fossil fuels on the other. On the demand side [@creutzig_towards_2018], by contrast, there are lower limits to how much energy is minimally required for a decent life [@grubler_low_2018 @millward-hopkins_providing_2020], depending on different assumptions about production-consumption infrastructures and service provision [@creutzig_towards_2018], as well as the prevalent social ideas about what constitutes decent living [@rao_energy_2019 @millward-hopkins_providing_2020]. Maximum possible energy supply and minimum necessary energy demand describe the corridor in which the simultaneous achievement of climate targets and a decent living for all is possible and, at the same time, restricts the distribution of available energy services among the population. If this dual objective is taken seriously in European climate policy, then there are practical limits to how unequal the society of the future can be, which go beyond the purely political. In fact, a limited energy supply creates an obvious, if rarely acknowledged, zero-sum game where energetic over-consumption by some has to be compensated by less consumption by others. 
 
 The average household energy footprint of European citizens was around 170 GJ per capita in 2015 [@eurostat_eurostat_nodate-3 @stadler_exiobase_2018] and the household carbon footprint around 7 tonnes CO2eq per capita in 2015 [@eurostat_eurostat_nodate-4]. However, the differences in average household energy and carbon footprints are large within and between different regions in Europe. Energy footprints ranged from less than 100 GJ per capita to over 300 GJ per capita [@oswald_large_2020], and carbon footprints from below 2.5 tonnes CO2eq per capita to 55 tonnes CO2eq per capita [@ivanova_unequal_2020]. Depending on the assumptions of different global mitigation scenarios, the average footprints likely need to be reduced to between 15.7 and 100 GJ per capita [@grubler_low_2018 @millward-hopkins_providing_2020], or 0.5 and 2.1 tCO2eq per capita [@akenji_1.5-degree_2019] by 2050, respectively.
 
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ exp_share_services_top_decile = round((pdat_basket %>% filter(eu_q_rank == 10, f
 
 Our results show that both of these factors play a role (Figure 2). Lower-income households, on average, spend larger shares of their expenditure in the housing sector. The bottom decile spent an average of `r exp_share_housing_bottom_decile`% of their household expenditure on housing, while the top decile spent `r exp_share_housing_top_decile`%. The housing sector stands out with a carbon intensity of consumption more than 3 times higher in the bottom decile (`r int_co2eq_housing_bottom_decile` kgCO2eq/€) than in the top decile (`r int_co2eq_housing_top_decile` kgCO2eq/€). At the same time, housing is by far the most carbon intensive sector and has the highest variance in carbon intensity among expenditure deciles. Overall, with increasing decile, the shares of mobility and services expenditures increase and the shares of housing, food and goods decrease. Households in the top decile spend about `r exp_share_services_top_decile`% in the service sector, which has the lowest carbon intensity of all consumption sectors, compared to `r exp_share_services_bottom_decile`% in the bottom decile. 
 
-The tendency for energy and carbon intensity to decrease with increasing affluence has been reported for the global level [@hubacek_global_2017] between countries and also within Europe [@sommer_carbon_2017]. Our results show that the four lowest European expenditure deciles make up 80% to 100% of the population in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, while less than 20% of the population in the higher-income European countries (Scandinavia, Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and Ireland) are in the lowest European expenditure deciles. Note here that this does not imply that there are no high-income households in Eastern Europe. Our analysis is based on average expenditure data from national income quintiles. This aggregation cuts off the lower and higher tails of the respective national expenditure distributions (see SI - Supplementary Note and Map). 
+The tendency for energy and carbon intensity to decrease with increasing affluence has been reported for the global level [@hubacek_global_2017] between countries and also within Europe [@sommer_carbon_2017 @bianco_understanding_2019]. Our results show that the four lowest European expenditure deciles make up 80% to 100% of the population in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, while less than 20% of the population in the higher-income European countries (Scandinavia, Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and Ireland) are in the lowest European expenditure deciles. Note here that this does not imply that there are no high-income households in Eastern Europe. Our analysis is based on average expenditure data from national income quintiles. This aggregation cuts off the lower and higher tails of the respective national expenditure distributions (see SI - Supplementary Note and Map). 
 
 The high intensities in the bottom four European expenditure deciles can be attributed in large part to more inefficient and dirtier domestic energy supply and demand technologies for heating and electricity generation in Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Romania. Poland alone was responsible for about 40% of total coal combustion for heat production in Europe in 2015 [@eurostat_eurostat_nodate-2], and had a higher average intensity of carbon per MJ of heat delivered than both Europe and the world [@werner_international_2017]. We did not account here for subsidies which could also have attributed to high energy and carbon intensities (see SI limitations, pp xx). 
 
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ flextable(df_scenario_info) %>%
   width(width = 2.1) 
 ```
 
-The various global supply side scenarios (SSP1-1.9, SSP2-1.9, GEA efficiency, IEA ETP B2DS)[@riahi_shared_2017 @gea_gea_nodate @grubler_low_2018] envisage household European energy use falling from the 2015 level of 92 EJ to around 21-31 EJ by 2050, equivalent to a per household reduction from a current average of 250 GJ to 64-94 GJ per adult equivalent. The differences in energy use in 2050 in the scenarios reflect different model assumptions about the rate of expansion of renewable energy and CCS capacity. These scenarios rely on substantial amounts of CCS, which is still a fairly speculative technology, and we therefore interpret them as ranges for the upper limits of 1.5°C-compatible energy supply [@riahi_shared_2017 @gea_gea_nodate].
+The various global supply side scenarios (SSP1-1.9, SSP2-1.9, GEA efficiency, IEA ETP B2DS)[@riahi_shared_2017 @gea_gea_nodate @grubler_low_2018] thus envisage household European energy use falling from the 2015 level of 92 EJ to around 21-31 EJ by 2050, equivalent to a per household reduction from a current average of 250 GJ to around 64-94 GJ per adult equivalent. The differences in energy use in 2050 in the scenarios reflect different model assumptions about the rate of expansion of renewable energy and CCS capacity. These scenarios rely on substantial amounts of CCS, which is still a fairly speculative technology, and we therefore interpret them as ranges for the upper limits of 1.5°C-compatible energy supply [@riahi_shared_2017 @gea_gea_nodate].
 
 It is even more difficult to determine a lower limit for the minimum amount of energy needed for a decent life. Such a lower limit depends strongly on the prevalent socio-cultural idea of what constitutes a decent life, and, perhaps even more strongly, on the physical infrastructure available to deliver this life. The two global demand side scenarios LED [@grubler_low_2018] and DLE [@millward-hopkins_providing_2020] that attempt to define such a limit conclude that, in principle, a very low energy footprint, between 16-53 GJ per household adult equivalent, could be sufficient. However, these scenarios rely on socio-technological transformations on a scale that, especially at the lower end, far exceed the current political discourse on the subject. These scenarios are 1.5°C compatible without resorting to any CCS but they all implicitly (LED) [@grubler_low_2018] or explicitly (DLE) [@millward-hopkins_providing_2020] assume near complete equality of consumption across the population. To put these low energy demand numbers in perspective, the average energy footprint in our sample is 250 per adult equivalent in 2015, about a factor 5 above the high estimate. Households in the bottom European expenditure decile, which almost entirely fell within the Eurostat definition of severe material deprivation [@eurostat_living_nodate], still had an energy footprint of 130 GJ per adult equivalent in 2015 (roughly 80 GJ/capita), factor 2.5 above the high estimate.