

Understanding the impacts of uncertainty on optimal policies

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¹Thanks to C. Ionescu, P. Jansson and to the Cartesian Seminar people.

Outline

- ▶ Results
- ▶ Their context
- ▶ Method
- ▶ A stylized emission problem
- ▶ Method (cont'd)

Results

ESD 2017-86, short summary:

We study the impact of uncertainty on optimal greenhouse gas (GHG) emission policies for a stylized emission problem. The results suggest that uncertainties about the implementability of decisions on emission reductions (or increases) call for more precautionary policies. In contrast, uncertainties about the implications of exceeding critical cumulated emission thresholds tend to make early emission reductions less rewarding.

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This is known since at least Hardin 1968.

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Focus on 1: when and by how much to reduce emissions?

Understanding the impacts of uncertainty on optimal policies → [Their context](#)

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- ▶ ... on the basis of observable current **states** (economic growth, cumulated emissions, current emission levels, etc.)
- ▶ Taking a control in a given state yields a transition to a **next** state and associated **reward** (costs, benefits, damages) but ...

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It's not really getting better, is it?

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It seems that we need to compare optimal policies in two distinct cases. But what are policies?

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Can we formalize these ideas? Can we study the impacts of uncertainties on policies with rigorous methods?

Understanding the impacts of uncertainty on optimal policies → [Method](#)

Method

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Rewards depend on a current state, on a selected control but also on a next state!

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A word-by-word translation from English into math. Unfortunately, things are a bit more complicated: viability!

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For “small” problems!

Let's take a decision!

► [Jump to "A stylized emission problem"](#)

► [Jump to "Method \(cont'd\)"](#)

► [Stop here!](#)

A stylized emission problem

Understanding the impacts of uncertainty on optimal policies → [A stylized emission problem](#)

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- ▶ Without loss of generality, we can take these increases to be **zero** and **one**.

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 - ▶ A “state of the world” $W = \{Good, Bad\}$.
- ▶ Thus, states are just tuples

$$State\ t = (\{0..t\}, E, T, W)$$

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Decision process

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- ▶ Similarly, the probability that effective technologies become available is low in the beginning and increases after a critical number of decision steps $crN : \mathbb{N}$.
- ▶ Once available, effective technologies stay available for ever.

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- ▶ Constraints: $p_{LH} \leq p_{LL}$ and $p_{HL} \leq p_{HH}$.

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 prob(e + 1, H, U, G) &= (1 - p_{LH}) * (1 - p_{A1}) * p_{S1} \\
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- ▶ Being in a bad world yields less benefits (more damages) than being in a good world.
- ▶ Low emissions yield less benefits (more costs, less growth) than high emissions.
- ▶ Implementing low emissions when effective technologies are **unavailable costs more** than implementing emissions when these technologies are **available**.

Rewards

Without loss of generality, we can take the benefits of being in a good world for a step to be one and define

$$\text{reward } t \times y(e, H, U, G) = 1 + h$$

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- ▶ The step costs of being in a **bad** world are $1 - b$
- ▶ $1 - b < h - la \Rightarrow$ reducing emissions is **never** a **best** choice!

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- ▶ $b = 0.5$, $lu = 0.1$, $la = 0.2$, $h = 0.3$.

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Results

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- ▶ $crN = 2 \Rightarrow$ it takes 3 steps to achieve states in which the probability that effective technologies for reducing GHG emissions become available increases from $pA1$ to $pA2$.

Deterministic case, basic facts

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- ▶ For any given policy sequence there is exactly one possible state-control trajectory.

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$[((0,H,U,G),L), ((0,L,U,G),L), ((0,L,U,G),L), ((0,L,U,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L),$
 $((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),)], 100\%, 10.5$

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► Expected sum of rewards = 11.3

Deterministic case, policies

► *Const High* policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards:

$[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((9,H,A,B),H)], 100\%, 9.7$

► Expected sum of rewards = 9.7.

► *Const Low* policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$[((0,H,U,G),L), ((0,L,U,G),L), ((0,L,U,G),L), ((0,L,U,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L), ((0,L,A,G),L)], 100\%, 10.5$

► Expected sum of rewards = 10.5

► Optimal policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),L), ((4,L,A,G),L), ((4,L,A,G),L), ((4,L,A,G),L), ((4,L,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H)], 100\%, 11.3$

► Expected sum of rewards = 11.3

► Optimal policies dictate **postponing** emission **reductions** until effective technologies for reducing emissions become available!

Understanding the impacts of uncertainty on optimal policies → [A stylized emission problem](#)

Uncertainty on implementability, basic facts

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- ▶ $p_{S2} = p_{A1} = 0$, $p_{S1} = p_{A2} = 1$ but ...

Uncertainty on implementability, basic facts

- ▶ $p_{S2} = p_{A1} = 0$, $p_{S1} = p_{A2} = 1$ but ...
- ▶ ... $p_{LL} = p_{HH} = 0.9$ and $p_{LH} = p_{HL} = 0.7$
- ▶ Effective technologies still become available after 4 steps and the state of the world turns bad after 6 steps at high emissions but ...

Uncertainty on implementability, basic facts

- ▶ $pS2 = pA1 = 0$, $pS1 = pA2 = 1$ but ...
- ▶ ... $pLL = pHH = 0.9$ and $pLH = pHL = 0.7$
- ▶ Effective technologies still become available after 4 steps and the state of the world turns bad after 6 steps at high emissions but ...
- ▶ ... a policy (optimal or not) now entails $2^9 = 512$ possible trajectories.

Uncertainty on implementability, policies

- ▶ *Const High* policies:

Uncertainty on implementability, policies

► *Const High* policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((9,H,A,B),)], 38.7\%, 9.7$
 $[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((8,L,A,B),)], 4.3\%, 9.6$
 $[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((4,L,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),)], 3.3\%, 10.1$
 \dots

Uncertainty on implementability, policies

► *Const High* policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((9,H,A,B),)], 38.7\%, 9.7$
 $[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((8,L,A,B),)], 4.3\%, 9.6$
 $[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((4,L,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),)], 3.3\%, 10.1$
 \dots

► Expected sum of rewards = 9.904.

Uncertainty on implementability, policies

► *Const High* policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((9,H,A,B),H)], 38.7\%, 9.7$
 $((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((8,L,A,B),H)], 4.3\%, 9.6$
 $((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((4,L,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H)], 3.3\%, 10.1$
 ...

► Expected sum of rewards = 9.904.

► **Optimal** policies:

Uncertainty on implementability, policies

► *Const High* policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$[(\langle 0, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 1, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 2, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 3, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 4, H, A, G \rangle, H),$
 $(\langle 5, H, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 6, H, A, B \rangle, H), (\langle 7, H, A, B \rangle, H), (\langle 8, H, A, B \rangle, H), (\langle 9, H, A, B \rangle,)], 38.7\%, 9.7$
 $[(\langle 0, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 1, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 2, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 3, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 4, H, A, G \rangle, H),$
 $(\langle 5, H, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 6, H, A, B \rangle, H), (\langle 7, H, A, B \rangle, H), (\langle 8, H, A, B \rangle, H), (\langle 8, L, A, B \rangle,)], 4.3\%, 9.6$
 $[(\langle 0, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 1, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 2, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 3, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 4, H, A, G \rangle, H),$
 $(\langle 4, L, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 5, H, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 6, H, A, B \rangle, H), (\langle 7, H, A, B \rangle, H), (\langle 8, H, A, B \rangle,)], 3.3\%, 10.1$
 ...

► Expected sum of rewards = 9.904.

► Optimal policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$[(\langle 0, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 1, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 2, H, U, G \rangle, L), (\langle 2, L, U, G \rangle, L), (\langle 2, L, A, G \rangle, L),$
 $(\langle 2, L, A, G \rangle, L), (\langle 2, L, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 3, H, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 4, H, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 5, H, A, G \rangle,)], 23.4\%, 11.2$
 $[(\langle 0, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 1, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 2, H, U, G \rangle, L), (\langle 3, H, U, G \rangle, L), (\langle 3, L, A, G \rangle, L),$
 $(\langle 3, L, A, G \rangle, L), (\langle 3, L, A, G \rangle, L), (\langle 3, L, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 4, H, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 5, H, A, G \rangle,)], 7.8\%, 11.3$
 $[(\langle 0, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 1, H, U, G \rangle, H), (\langle 2, H, U, G \rangle, L), (\langle 2, L, U, G \rangle, L), (\langle 2, L, A, G \rangle, L),$
 $(\langle 2, L, A, G \rangle, L), (\langle 2, L, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 2, L, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 3, H, A, G \rangle, H), (\langle 4, H, A, G \rangle,)], 7.8\%, 11.1$
 ...

Uncertainty on implementability, policies

► *Const High* policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((9,H,A,B),))], 38.7\%, 9.7$
 $((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((8,L,A,B),))], 4.3\%, 9.6$
 $((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((4,L,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),))], 3.3\%, 10.1$
 ...

► Expected sum of rewards = 9.904.

► Optimal policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L), ((2,L,U,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L),$
 $((2,L,A,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),H), ((3,H,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),))], 23.4\%, 11.2$
 $((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L), ((3,H,U,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L),$
 $((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),))], 7.8\%, 11.3$
 $((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L), ((2,L,U,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L),$
 $((2,L,A,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),H), ((2,L,A,G),H), ((3,H,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),))], 7.8\%, 11.1$
 ...

► Expected sum of rewards = 11.085.

Uncertainty on implementability, policies

► *Const High* policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((9,H,A,B),))], 38.7\%, 9.7$
 $((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((8,L,A,B),))], 4.3\%, 9.6$
 $((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H),$
 $((4,L,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),))], 3.3\%, 10.1$
 ...

► Expected sum of rewards = 9.904.

► Optimal policies:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

$((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L), ((2,L,U,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L),$
 $((2,L,A,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),H), ((3,H,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),))], 23.4\%, 11.2$
 $((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L), ((3,H,U,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L),$
 $((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),))], 7.8\%, 11.3$
 $((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),L), ((2,L,U,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),L),$
 $((2,L,A,G),L), ((2,L,A,G),H), ((2,L,A,G),H), ((3,H,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),))], 7.8\%, 11.1$
 ...

► Expected sum of rewards = 11.085.

► Under uncertainty on implementability, optimal policies dictate **earlier** emission **reductions**!

Understanding the impacts of uncertainty on optimal policies → [A stylized emission problem](#)

More uncertainties

More uncertainties

- ▶ What happens to optimal policies if we account for **more uncertainties** in the decision problem?

More uncertainties

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 - ▶ Uncertainty on the availability of efficient **technologies**:

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 - ▶ Uncertainty on the **consequences of exceeding** the critical cumulated emission threshold crE :

More uncertainties

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- ▶ We want to estimate the impacts of:
 - ▶ Uncertainty on the availability of efficient technologies:
 - ▶ There is a small probability that technologies become available before 4 steps and a small probability that technologies do not become available even after 4 steps!
 - ▶ Uncertainty on the consequences of exceeding the critical cumulated emission threshold crE :
 - ▶ There is a **small** probability that the world turns bad before 6 high emission steps and a **small** probability that the world doesn't turn bad even after crE has been exceeded!

Uncertainty on the availability of technologies

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- ▶ p_{LL} , p_{HH} , p_{LH} , p_{HL} , p_{S1} and p_{S2} as before but . . .

Uncertainty on the availability of technologies

- ▶ p_{LL} , p_{HH} , p_{LH} , p_{HL} , p_{S1} and p_{S2} as before but ...
- ▶ ... $p_{A1} = 0.1$ and $p_{A2} = 0.9$ instead of 0 and 1.

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- ▶ $2^n * (n + 1) = 5120$ possible trajectories for a policy sequence for $n = 9$ steps!

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- ▶ p_{LL} , p_{HH} , p_{LH} , p_{HL} , p_{S1} and p_{S2} as before but ...
- ▶ ... $p_{A1} = 0.1$ and $p_{A2} = 0.9$ instead of 0 and 1.
- ▶ $2^n * (n + 1) = 5120$ possible trajectories for a policy sequence for $n = 9$ steps!
- ▶ Optimal policies entail the **same** most likely trajectories. The expected sum of rewards is almost the **same**!

Uncertainty on the consequences of exceeding crE

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- ▶ p_{LL} , p_{HH} , p_{LH} , p_{HL} , p_{A1} and p_{A2} as before but ...

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Uncertainty on the consequences of exceeding crE

- ▶ p_{LL} , p_{HH} , p_{LH} , p_{HL} , p_{A1} and p_{A2} as before but ...
- ▶ ... $p_{S1} = 0.9$ and $p_{S2} = 0.1$ instead of 1 and 0.
- ▶ 51200 possible trajectories for a 9-steps policy sequence!
- ▶ For *Const High* policies the most likely trajectory is unchanged but ...

Uncertainty on the consequences of exceeding crE

- ▶ Optimal policies look now quite different:

Uncertainty on the consequences of exceeding crE

► Optimal policies look now quite different:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

[((0,H,U,G),**H**), ((1,H,U,G),**H**), ((2,H,U,G),**H**), ((3,H,U,G),**L**), ((3,L,A,G),**L**),
((3,L,A,G),**L**), ((3,L,A,G),**L**), ((3,L,A,G),**H**), ((4,H,A,G),**H**), ((5,H,A,G),)], 5.9%, 11.3

[((0,H,U,G),**H**), ((1,H,U,B),**H**), ((2,H,U,B),**H**), ((3,H,U,B),**H**), ((4,H,A,B),**H**),
((5,H,A,B),**H**), ((6,H,A,B),**H**), ((7,H,A,B),**H**), ((8,H,A,B),**H**), ((9,H,A,B),)], 2.5%, 7.2

[((0,H,U,G),**H**), ((1,H,U,G),**H**), ((2,H,U,B),**H**), ((3,H,U,B),**H**), ((4,H,A,B),**H**),
((5,H,A,B),**H**), ((6,H,A,B),**H**), ((7,H,A,B),**H**), ((8,H,A,B),**H**), ((9,H,A,B),)], 2.3%, 7.7
...

Uncertainty on the consequences of exceeding crE

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[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L),
((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),)], 5.9%, 11.3

[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,B),H), ((2,H,U,B),H), ((3,H,U,B),H), ((4,H,A,B),H),
((5,H,A,B),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((9,H,A,B),)], 2.5%, 7.2

[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,B),H), ((3,H,U,B),H), ((4,H,A,B),H),
((5,H,A,B),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((9,H,A,B),)], 2.3%, 7.7
...

► Expected sum of rewards = 9.543

Uncertainty on the consequences of exceeding crE

► Optimal policies look now quite different:

► trajectories, probabilities, rewards

[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,G),H), ((3,H,U,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L),
((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),L), ((3,L,A,G),H), ((4,H,A,G),H), ((5,H,A,G),)], 5.9%, 11.3

[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,B),H), ((2,H,U,B),H), ((3,H,U,B),H), ((4,H,A,B),H),
((5,H,A,B),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((9,H,A,B),)], 2.5%, 7.2

[((0,H,U,G),H), ((1,H,U,G),H), ((2,H,U,B),H), ((3,H,U,B),H), ((4,H,A,B),H),
((5,H,A,B),H), ((6,H,A,B),H), ((7,H,A,B),H), ((8,H,A,B),H), ((9,H,A,B),)], 2.3%, 7.7
...

► Expected sum of rewards = 9.543

► Under uncertainty on the consequences of exceeding crE ,
precautionary policies become sub-optimal: optimal policies
dictate later emission reductions!

Understanding the impacts of uncertainty on optimal policies → [A stylized emission problem](#)

Wrap-up

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- Uncertainties about the **implementability** of decisions on emission reductions (or increases) call for **more precautionary** policies.

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- ▶ Uncertainties about the implementability of decisions on emission reductions (or increases) call for more precautionary policies.
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Wrap-up

- ▶ Uncertainties about the implementability of decisions on emission reductions (or increases) call for more precautionary policies.
- ▶ In contrast, uncertainties about the implications of exceeding critical cumulated emission thresholds tend to make precautionary policies sub-optimal.
- ▶ The results are rigorous: optimality of “optimal” policies is machine-checked.

I hope that my first slide is a little bit clearer now!

Understanding the impacts of uncertainty on optimal policies → [Method \(cont'd\)](#)

Method (cont'd)

Generic, verified backwards induction

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- ▶ The challenge is implementing **total** functions

$$bi : (t : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow (n : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow PolicySeq\ t\ n$$

Generic, verified backwards induction

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$$bi : (t : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow (n : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow PolicySeq\ t\ n$$

and

$$biLemma : (t : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow (n : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow OptPolicySeq\ (bi\ t\ n)$$

Generic, verified backwards induction

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for **arbitrary** $M, \oplus, \sqsubseteq, State, Ctrl, next, reward$ and $meas$.

Generic, verified backwards induction

- The challenge is implementing total functions

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and

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for arbitrary M , \oplus , \sqsubseteq , $State$, $Ctrl$, $next$, $reward$ and $meas$.

- As it turns out, if \oplus , \sqsubseteq and $meas$ fulfill **minimal requirements**, the implementation directly follows from Bellman's principle of optimality.

Generic, verified backwards induction

- ▶ The challenge is implementing total functions

$$bi : (t : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow (n : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow PolicySeq\ t\ n$$

and

$$biLemma : (t : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow (n : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow OptPolicySeq\ (bi\ t\ n)$$

for arbitrary M , \oplus , \sqsubseteq , $State$, $Ctrl$, $next$, $reward$ and $meas$.

- ▶ As it turns out, if \oplus , \sqsubseteq and $meas$ fulfill minimal requirements, the implementation directly follows from Bellman's principle of optimality.

Now we get to the meat of the theory!

Bellman's principle of optimality

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 \text{OptExt} & : \text{PolicySeq } (t + 1) \text{ } m \rightarrow \text{Policy } t \rightarrow \text{Type} \\
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- ▶ We can **prove** the principle (**implement** *Bellman*) if ...

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- ▶ *meas* fulfills a **monotonicity** condition (Ionescu 2009):

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Remember that *M* is a functor. Thus, it has a *fmap* : $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (M\ A \rightarrow M\ B)$!

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Proof idea: $val \times (p' :: ps') \sqsubseteq val \times (p' :: ps) \sqsubseteq val \times (p :: ps)$ and transitivity of \sqsubseteq .

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ps : PolicySeq (t + 1) m

ps = *bi* (t + 1) m

ops : OptPolicySeq *ps*

ops = *biLemma* (t + 1) m

p : Policy t

p = *optExt ps*

oep : OptExt *ps p*

oep = *optExtLemma ps*

The question is if and under which conditions we can compute optimal extensions of arbitrary policy sequences.

But this is for another talk!

Thanks for your attention!